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Abstract
We consider a government that can only raise funds by levying distortionary taxes.
We allow the government to collect taxes in a given periodthat are basedon incomes
earned in previous periods. We show that once we do so, given any debt path, the government
can adjust its tax policy so as to attain that debt path without affecting equilibrium allocations
or prices.
r 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we consider a government that can only raise funds by levying
distortionary taxes. However, we allow the government to collect taxes in a given
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1 We show that once we
do so, given any debt path, the government can adjust its tax policy so as to attain
that debt path without affecting equilibrium allocations or prices.
The intuition behindour result is simple. Suppose that the interest rate is 0. Private
agents do not care whether the government sets a 30% tax on current labor income
to be paidnow, or a 15% tax to be paidnow andan ad d itional 15% tax that is based
on today’s income, but can be paid in the future. While the path of government debt
can be changedthrough such a choice, only the present value of taxes matters for
real allocations. For this argument to apply, it is important that households have
correct anticipations about the possibly state-contingent future government policy
andthat they are able to borrow andsave at the market interest rate.
There are two main implications of our result. The ﬁrst is theoretical. It is often
said that government ﬁnancing decisions affect allocations if taxes are distortionary,
andd o not affect allocations if taxes are lump-sum. Our result shows that this
statement is misleading. Financing decisions are irrelevant for any government that
can freely adjust the timing of tax payments. The distinction between distortionary
andnond istortionary taxes is a redherring. This is especially important if the
restriction on the class of admissible tax schedules is viewed only as the result of
underlying asymmetric information: to condition future tax payments on past
actions, the government does not need any additional information.
The second (related) implication is in reference to the large literature that studies
optimal linear taxation (see Chari andKehoe, 1999 ). These papers all restrict current
taxes to be functions of current incomes. This is without loss of generality in terms of
welfare. However, once taxes can be functions of past incomes, these analyses cannot
pin down an optimal path of debt.
There is a large literature on debt irrelevance. The ﬁrst formal statement comes
from Barro (1974). If taxes are lump sum andagents are either inﬁnitely livedor part
of dynasties linked by operative transfers, Barro proves that both initial debt and the
entire evolution path of debt are irrelevant. While lump sum taxes are essential for
the ﬁrst result, we show that they are not for the secondpart.
2
The results that are closest to ours stem from generational accounting, an
approach advocated by Auerbach et al. (1991, 1994) and Kotlikoff (1992).
According to generational accounting, the timing of taxes (and hence debt) is
irrelevant; an appropriate analysis of ﬁscal policy shouldfocus on the present value
of taxes paidby d ifferent generations. We extendthis intuition, andformally




1It is worth mentioning that the dependence of labor income taxes on past incomes is not just a
theoretical possibility. For example, in the UnitedStates, both social security transfers andwelfare
payments depend on income histories, and part of the taxes on labor income are postponed by the
presence of IRAs and401(k) plans.
2The assumption that agents are inﬁnitely livedor part of d ynasties is essential for both results.
3In both Auerbach et al. (1994) and Kotlikoff (1999), the authors mention that their approach is still
valid even when taxes are distortionary. However, their emphasis is on the accounting procedure, so they
mainly focus on characterizing the incidence of distortionary taxes. Accordingly, some of their examples ﬁt
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show for state-contingent debt: in their environment, when state-contingent capital
taxes are allowed, the use of state-contingent debt becomes superﬂuous.
2. Main result
Consider a two-period economy, populated by a continuum of identical
households whose preferences are uðc1;n1Þþuðc2;n2Þ; where ct is consumption in
period t; nt is the amount spent working in period t; and u satisﬁes standard
assumptions. The production function is such that, for arbitrary x; x units of time
spent working produce x units of (perishable) output.
The government uses g units of the private goodin period2 to prod uce a public
goodandraises revenues through taxes on labor income. Suppose ﬁrst that the
government imposes a potentially nonlinear tax schedule f1 on period1 labor
income, anda potentially nonlinear tax sched ule f2 on period2 labor income. Given
these tax schedules, let R
1 denote the equilibrium interest rate between periods 1 and
2; n
t denote the equilibrium level of labor in period t; and c
t denote the equilibrium
level of consumption in period t: The government debt in this equilibrium (after
period1) is equal to  f1ðn
1 Þ:
Now, suppose insteadthat the government can tax period -1 labor income in
period2 as well. Let f1t be the tax rate on period-1 labor income collected in period
t: If f11 þ f12=R




1 pn1 þ n2=R
1   f11ðn1Þ f12ðn2Þ=R
1   f2ðn2Þ=R
1
¼n1 þ n2=R
1   f1ðn1Þ f2ðn2Þ=R
1 :
Hence, the householdbud get set is the same at R
1 : It follows that, under this new
government policy, the equilibrium remains unchangedin terms of consumption,
labor, andthe interest rate.
However, the debt level at the end of period 1 does change: it becomes  f11ðn
1 Þ:
Note that by varying f11; the government can achieve any level of debt (positive
or negative) that it desires. It is exactly in this sense that we mean that debt is
irrelevant: given any desired debt level, the government can choose the tax policy so
as to achieve that debt level without affecting equilibrium allocations or interest
rates.
The result can be summarizedas follows. When people are choosing how hardto
work, they consider only how the present value of their tax payments changes with
respect to labor supply. The government can alter the timing of when it collects the
taxes that are basedon a particular period ’s income without affecting this present
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our conditions for irrelevance, whereas in others irrelevance only holds if the response of agents to changes
in the tax policy is neglected.
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adjust its debt without affecting the equilibrium.
4
3. Remarks
We ﬁrst consider four extensions for the result.
Remark 1. The result generalizes readily to economies with more than two periods.
Remark 2. The result can be readily extended to environments with capital income
taxes or consumption taxes.
Remark 3. The result also generalizes easily to economies with multiple types of
private agents, whether the type is observable to the government or not.
Remark 4. In settings in which agents have private information, it may be
optimal for taxes to depend not just on the agents’ observed choices, but
also on their reports to a central tax authority (Golosov et al., 2003). Our
result can be extended to include these kinds of tax systems. Speciﬁcally, let
rtAR be a report that each agent must submit in period t; tax collections
can now depend on ðr1;y;rtÞ as well as on ðn1;y;ntÞ: The household’s choice
problem now includes the optimal choice of r: Our result extends directly to this
framework.
Remark 5. It is possible to extendthe proposition to environments with uncertainty.
This extension is trivial in the case of complete markets, but also applies to many
incomplete-market settings. As an example, suppose that g can take the values
g1;y;gS in period2. Assume there is an equilibrium in which the government
imposes tax schedule ft on period-t labor income andlet q1;y;qS be the state
prices. The householdbud get constraint is




When markets are complete, the government does not affect this constraint if it
collects taxes in period-1 income according to a schedule f11 in period1 anda
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equivalence andthe Mod igliani–Miller theorem. In Modigliani and Miller (1958), the timing of dividend
payments is irrelevant for the present value of a ﬁrm. In the case of Ricardian equivalence with lump-sum
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rich tax structure to be able to change the timing of tax collections without affecting asset prices. In this
case, the timing of taxes can be changedwith no consequences on the present value of government
spending.





As a consequence, the ﬁrst-periodsurplus can be changedarbitrarily without
affecting the allocation of consumption andleisure, nor the equilibrium prices. The
government has also many degrees of freedom which can be used to alter the way its
deﬁcit/surplus depends on the realization of g; as in Chari et al. (1994), without any
effect on real variables.
When markets are incomplete, a similar result applies as long as the tax policy
does not change the span of consumption and leisure allocations a household can
attain. Formally, if a householdis restrictedto choose allocations so that fc2ðsÞ 
n2ðsÞ f2ðn2ðsÞ;sÞg
S
s¼1AD; with D being a linear space, a sufﬁcient condition for the
government not to change the real allocation is to choose f12 so that (1) holds and
ff12ðn1;sÞg
S
s¼1AD for all possible values of n1: A simple case arises when there is
uncertainty andonly risk-free borrowing andlend ing is allowed . In this case, the
government can alter the path of (risk-free) debt without affecting the real allocation
by choosing f11 and f12 subject to (1) and to the additional constraint that f12 is
independent of the realization of g:
Our result does have two signiﬁcant limitations.
Remark 6. The version of Ricardian Equivalence proved by Barro (1974)
contemplates variations in the level of initial debt. In his setting with lump-sum
taxes, such variations hadno effect on the set of competitive equilibria. This result is
not true in our setting with distortionary taxes. We assumed no initial level of debt;
changing the initial level of debt would change the equilibrium set. Intuitively, any
extra initial debt must be paid off using distortionary taxes, and this will cause a
welfare loss.
Remark 7. Our result hinges on the fact that all agents are alive in all periods. Debt
is relevant in overlapping-generations economies, although it is possible that the
same equilibrium allocation andprice system may be consistent with d ifferent tax




The main contribution of this paper is theoretical. We ﬁndthat the path of
government debt generally does not affect real allocations, even when taxes are
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must be allowedto d ependon past incomes.
Is it possible for tax systems to exhibit this kind of history dependence in practice?
One difﬁculty is that the government may not have sufﬁcient enforcement
mechanisms to deter agents from spending the resources they would need to meet
future tax obligations. This is presumably one reason for the pervasive use of
withholding.
However, these enforcement concerns do not prevent governments from
conditioning current transfers on past outcomes. (Indeed, at least in the United
States, social security transfers do exhibit this kind of history dependence.) If we
make this weaker assumption instead, then we can still obtain a local debt
irrelevance result, as opposedto the global theorem that we obtain in the paper.
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